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First Amendment jurisprudence impressive. I plan to keep it 
handy as a ready reference. 
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE. 
By Martin Redish.l New York: Oxford University Press. 
1995. Pp. 229. Hardcover, $39.95. 
Richard W. Murphy2 
In The Constitution as Political Structure, Professor Martin 
Redish argues that the Supreme Court has ignored or mangled 
the Constitution's federalism and separation-of-powers require-
ments. He suggests that, contrary to the suggestions of some 
scholars, the Supreme Court has a duty to vigorously and consist-
ently enforce these provisions for at least two reasons. First, the 
Court should enforce them because they are in the Constitution. 
If one values rule of law (and Professor Redish obviously does), 
then one should enforce the whole Constitution-it's cheating to 
pick favorite provisions. Second, he argues that the Constitu-
tion's structural provisions are a great bulwark against tyranny. 
To ignore them is to risk sliding down the slippery slope to loss of 
liberty. 
In light of these reasons, Professor Redish contends the 
Supreme Court should: put real limits on the reach of Congress's 
Commerce Clause power (strongly foreshadowing the majority 
opinion of United States v. Lopez3) (p. 49-61); demolish the 
(mythical?) Dormant Commerce Clause (p. 63-98); abandon 
functionalist approaches to separation-of-powers in favor of a 
"pragmatic formalist" approach (p. 99-134); and adopt a "polit-
ical commitment" approach that would put teeth (though, it 
turns out, not sharp ones) into the doctrine that the legislature 
cannot delegate legislative power (p. 135-61). Along the way, 
Professor Redish discusses the normative political theories that 
underlie the Constitution's structural provisions and offers quick 
critiques of competing scholarly views concerning their 
interpretation. 
This book's greatest strength is its often devastating critique 
of the Court's federalism jurisprudence. Professor Redish per-
1. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
2. Law Clerk to the Honorable Stephen S. Trott, 9th Circuit; J.D. suma cum laude 
University of Minnesota Law School, 1995; B.A. Carleton College, 1987. 
3. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
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suasively argues that the Court should protect residual state sov-
ereignty by enforcing real limits to the Commerce Clause rather 
than by grafting meaning onto the tautological Tenth Amend-
ment. (pp. 39-49) He describes the Dormant Commerce Clause 
as "little more than a figment of the Supreme Court's imagina-
tion" (p. 98) and argues with great force that it is a perversion of 
the Constitution's text and structure. (p. 63-98) Professor Redish 
does a wonderful job of diagnosing the disease of doctrinal 
inconsistency. 
He is less successful in showing that he has found effective 
cures. With the notable exception of the suggested cure for the 
Dormant Commerce Clause (i.e., get rid of it), the standards Pro-
fessor Redish suggests for interpretation and enforcement of the 
Constitution's structural provisions might well prove little more 
coherent (or effective for the protection of liberty) than the 
Court's current approaches. 
Still, according to Professor Redish's view of things, reform 
of the status quo is crucial because vigorous, correct enforcement 
of these provisions-particularly separation of powers-is vital 
for the protection of liberty against creeping tyranny. This prem-
ise is no doubt true to a certain extent. Perhaps, however, it un-
derestimates the sturdiness of the governmental scheme the 
framers designed-a system probably strong enough to withstand 
a judiciary that, through little (if any) fault of its own, has a hard 
time deciding the hard cases governed by the vague language of 
the Constitution's structural provisions. 
Professor Redish covers a remarkable amount of ground in 
his short book. To better highlight the strengths and weaknesses 
of The Constitution as Political Structure, however, the remainder 
of this review narrows the focus to a mere two of Professor Red-
ish's primary suggestions: that the Supreme Court revivify feder-
alism by enforcing real limits to Congress's Commerce Clause 
power, and that the Court reinvigorate separation of powers by 
adopting his "pragmatic formalist" approach to constitutional in-
terpretation. Examination of these two suggestions indicates 
that, to switch metaphors, although Professor Redish has shown 
where the doctrinal roof leaks, he, like the Supreme Court (or 
probably anybody else for that matter-it's that kind of prob-
lem), does not know how to fix it. Fortunately, maybe a leaky 
roof is not so bad. 
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The Constitution as Political Structure offers powerful and 
timely criticisms of the Supreme Court's current approach to fed-
eralism problems-particularly as they relate to the Tenth 
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause. Professor 
Redish's discussion of the proper reach of federal power, how-
ever, also betrays a fundamental (though eminently understanda-
ble) weakness in his book. In essence, he argues that the 
Supreme Court should abandon attempts to use the Tenth 
Amendment to protect state sovereignty and should instead do 
so by enforcing real limits to the Commerce Clause power-an 
approach the majority of the Court has since attempted to adopt 
in part in United States v. Lopez.4 However, like the majority 
opinion in Lopez, Professor Redish offers little conceptual gui-
dance to frame future Commerce Clause decisions. 
Professor Redish's criticisms of Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, however, are incisive. The Tenth Amendment provides 
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." As the Supreme Court it-
self notes on occasion, this amendment is essentially tautological. 
On its face, it simply means that the federal government enjoys 
only those powers granted it by the Constitution. 
As Professor Redish relates, the tautological nature of this 
amendment did not stop the Court from using it in National 
League of Cities v. Userys as a backstop to protect the states from 
a voracious federal government armed with the seemingly abso-
lute power of the Commerce/Necessary and Proper Clause com-
bination. (p. 43-44) The National League of Cities Court held 
that the Tenth Amendment creates an "enclave" of state power 
that is immune from and affirmatively limits the federal govern-
ment's exercise of its enumerated powers. (p. 43) Congress 
therefore cannot use its Commerce Clause power "to directly dis-
place the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional governmental functions .... "6 
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a 
5-4 Court overruled National League of Cities partially on the 
reasonable grounds that nobody could tell what a traditional gov-
ernmental function was or why anyone should care.7 Garcia's 
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
5. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
6. 426 U.S. at 852. 
7. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 538-39, 545-47 (1985). 
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central theme is that the states primarily protect themselves from 
an overweening federal government by virtue of their participa-
tion in the political process that forms the federal government. 
(p. 39-42) They do not need (or have) an ill-defined enclave of 
traditional governmental function protection from Big Federal 
Brothef.B According to Professor Redish, Garcia "probably 
amounted to an almost total judicial abdication of any role in 
enforcing constitutional protections of federalism .... " (p. 23) 
The Court partially unabdicated in New York v. United 
States, in which it ruled that the Congress cannot use the Com-
merce Clause to "compel the States to enact or administer a fed-
eral regulatory program."9 The federal government can preempt 
state laws with federal laws; it can bribe states to pass laws, but it 
cannot force states to write their laws according to federal dic-
tates. As Professor Redish tells the story, the New York opinion, 
like National League of Cities, seems ultimately to rest on the 
idea that states enjoy an enclave of sovereign power that affirma-
tively limits the federal government's enumerated powers. (p. 44-
45) The New York enclave, however, is far smaller than the Na-
tional League of Cities enclave.w 
Professor Redish rejects both enclave and abdication ap-
proaches to federalism. He insists the Tenth Amendment is a 
sort of "exclamation point" designed to emphasize that the fed-
eral government enjoys only those powers that the Constitution 
gives it. (p. 44) This amendment therefore does not carve out 
additional enclaves of state sovereign power from areas that 
would otherwise fall within the scope of federal power. By the 
same token, however, Professor Redish argues that the Court 
should not take the overly-deferential Garciaesqe approach of 
trusting the political process to protect federalist values. Instead, 
the Court should adjudicate the Constitution as written and en-
force federalism by refusing to permit Congress to step beyond 
the limits of its enumerated powers. (p. 48-49) 
The root of Professor Redish's abdication critique is the idea 
that the Supreme Court has allowed the Commerce Clause-
with liberal help from the Necessary and Proper Clause-to 
usurp such gargantuan powers that it has turned into a Congress-
can-do-anything Clause, transforming the United States from a 
8. !d. at 556-57. 
9. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992). 
10. But perhaps just as confusing. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1030-33 
(9th Cir. 1995) (Brady Act does not violate Tenth Amendment in post-New York world), 
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3642 (U.S. Mar. 12, 1996) (No. 95-1478). But see Koog 
v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 457-61 (5th Cir. 1996) (It does.). 
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federalist to a consolidated, national government. (p. 49-51) The 
modern Commerce Clause's reach is, of course, largely a function 
of the doctrine that Congress may regulate activities which sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.11 The required level of 
"substantial affect" is hardly self-evident. Therefore, because 
everything is connected to something else, one could colorably 
argue that Congress can regulate anything. 
To fend off this absurdity, Professor Redish exhorts that the 
Commerce Clause must have some limits. He offers the follow-
ing illustration: 
For example, if Congress were to enact the proposed domestic 
violence legislation rendering family violence a federal crime, 
and were to purport to ground the act in its commerce power, 
the Court should hold the legislation unconstitutional. Any 
connection between the act and commerce of any kind, much 
less interstate commerce, is simply too remote. If such a law 
were upheld, it would be difficult to imagine any federal legis-
lation that would fall outside the scope of the commerce 
power. And it is this inquiry that the Court must make when 
asked to review the constitutionality of statutes grounded in 
the commerce power that affect interstate commerce in at 
most speculative or remote ways. Before upholding such laws, 
the Court must be able to contemplate conceivable statutes 
that would exceed constitutional limits. While this mode of 
analysis is admittedly both awkward and difficult, there would 
seem to exist no viable alternative to a Court that simultane-
ously wishes to extend Congress's power yet adhere to the lim-
its of the Constitution. 
(p. 51) Thus, the thrust of the argument is that unless some con-
ceivable statutes exceed Congress's commerce power, the Consti-
tution's federalist structure means nothing. This argument is 
perfectly sound, so far as it goes; but, left to itself, does little to 
provide specific guidance on how to corral the commerce power. 
Professor Redish does, however, give two more concrete ex-
amples of ways to begin this process. First, he suggests that the 
Court should be less deferential when determining whether an 
activity "affects" interstate commerce-and thus falls within 
Congress's regulatory grasp. (p. 53-56) Professor Redish argues 
that the Court's rational basis approach to this inquiry often 
merely masks judicial abstention. He suggests that, if the Court 
is going to use this deferential standard (he implies that more 
11. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
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searching scrutiny may be appropriate), it must at the very least 
really apply it. 
Professor Redish's second suggestion is that the Court limit 
use of the "class of activities" doctrine of United States v. Darby, 
which allows Congress to regulate "intrastate transactions which 
are so commingled with or related to interstate commerce that all 
must be regulated if the interstate commerce is to be effectively 
controlled."I2 (p. 56-59) He maintains that this doctrine has 
been improperly extended to allow Congress to regulate intra-
state activities even where they are not so commingled with in-
terstate activities as to render impractical regulation of solely the 
interstate portion.13 
Supreme Court adoption of these two suggestions would no 
doubt curb Congress's reach somewhat. However, they do not 
really hack at the "substantial affect" source of the Commerce 
Clause's almost plenary power. Thus, Professor Redish does not 
so much suggest a theory that could coherently limit the Com-
merce Clause power as he espouses an attitude that it should be 
limited. 
In this respect he is in very good company-the majority ( al-
beit a slim one) of the Supreme Court. The Court's opinion in 
the 1995 case United States v. Lopezl4 reads a little as if Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had just read the federalism chapters in The 
Constitution as Political Structure, and it shares the same (per-
haps inevitableis) difficulty-it exhorts that the Commerce 
Clause must not mean that Congress can do everything, but it 
imposes no framework for determining when Congress has gone 
too far. 
In Lopez, the defendant challenged a law that made it a fed-
eral crime "knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] 
knows ... is a school zone."I6 Five of the Justices joined in an 
12. 312 u.s. 100, 121 (1941). 
13. Professor Redish cites Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), as an example 
of this practice. In Perez, the defendant was convicted of loan sharking in violation of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act. He argued that Congress could not regulate his activi-
ties, which he maintained were solely intrastate. The Court, relying on a "class of activi-
ties" rationale (i.e., loansharking in general is bad for interstate commerce), disagreed 
and upheld his conviction. Professor Redish persuasively argues that, because Perez's 
criminal case required individualized adjudication, it would not have been impractical to 
create a regime which allowed defendants to prove that their activities were entirely intra-
state and thus beyond Congress's reach. Therefore, Perez marked an unnecessary and 
improper extension of federal Commerce Clause power. (p. 57-59) 
14. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
15. Id. at 1634 ("These are not precise formulations [of the limits of the commerce 
power], and in the nature of things they cannot be."). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(2)(A) (1994). 
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opinion that struck this provision because the mere activity of 
possessing a gun in a school zone does not substantially affect 
interstate commerce. The government made various arguments 
to the effect that violence harms learning and thus will harm the 
economy, etc. The five rejected the government's arguments, 
reasoning that if such indirect effects were sufficient to bring an 
activity within the reach of Commerce Clause legislation, then 
Congress could regulate anything and federalism would be mean-
ingless.17 Four Justices dissented, in part because they accepted 
the government's (obviously true-to some extent or another) 
argument that guns in school zones affect interstate commerce.1s 
This 5-4 split indicates that, in hard cases, whether an activ-
ity "substantially affects" interstate commerce depends on little 
more than the length of the Justices' collective feet. What does it 
take to substantially affect interstate commerce? Well, appar-
ently the Justices know it when they see it.t9 The mushiness of 
this standard is not a problem for those who don't worry too 
much about the balance of state and federal power. It is more of 
a problem for those, such as Professor Redish and perhaps the 
Lopez majority, who genuinely wish to consistently rein in the 
Commerce Clause. To reach this result, a clearer doctrine than 
the 1-know-it-has-a-substantial-effect-on-interstate-commerce-
when-1-see-it test must evolve. Justice Thomas makes a similar 
point in his concurrence in Lopez in which he suggests reconsid-
eration of the "substantial effects" test on the grounds that it of-
fers no principled way to keep the federal government from 
swallowing the states.zo 
II 
Professor Redish admits that, given two hundred years of 
legal and social developments, it is late in the day to expect con-
17. 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("Under the theories that the Government presents in support 
of§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. 
Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."). 
18. Id. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
19. Not that this "standard" is necessarily a bad one. See Paul Gewirtz, On"/ Know 
It When I See It", 105 Yale L.J. 1023 (1996). 
20. 115 S. Ct. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("While the principal dissent con-
cedes that there are limits to federal power, the sweeping nature of our current test en-
ables the dissent to argue that Congress can regulate gun possession. . . . In an 
appropriate case, I believe that we must further reconsider our "substantial effects" test 
with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Com-
merce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence."). 
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stitutional federalism, by itself, to work as intended "as a truly 
effective check on the concentration of political power." (p. 99) 
The states may no longer be able to prevent federal tyranny. He 
therefore reasons that it is all the more vital that the federal 
branches check one another to forestall tyrannical concentration 
of power in any one branch. Thus, the Supreme Court should 
vigorously and consistently enforce separation of powers. 
According to Professor Redish, however, the Supreme 
Court suffers from a "split personality" when it comes to enforce-
ment of separation of powers. (p. 3) Sometimes the Court ap-
plies the constitutional text "with a formalistic vengeance." (I d.) 
Often, however, the Court relies on ad hoc functionalist tests that 
find no support in the Constitution's text or structure and "ap-
pear[ ] to be designed to do little more than rationalize incur-
sions by one branch of the federal government into the domain 
of another."2t (Id.) Under one such functionalist approach, the 
Court strikes down interbranch usurpation of power where the 
usurping branch acquires "too much" power or interferes "too 
much" with the workings of the usurpee branch. Under another 
approach, the Court balances the evils of a given interbranch 
usurpation against the benefits the usurpation creates. (p. 125) 
Professor Redish argues that unadorned functionalism is 
bad in the separation-of-powers context for two reasons. First, it 
is bad not to enforce the Constitution as written. Second, the 
separation-of-powers structure required by the Constitution was 
designed as a "prophylactic" to prevent creeping tyranny. By 
abandoning this structure, the Court creates the danger that it 
will, on a case-by-case basis, gradually destroy the balance of 
power necessary to prevent one of the branches from assuming 
tyrannical powers. (p. 106-08) 
But the answer to functionalism is not a narrow formalism. 
Rather, to halt our slide down the slippery slope to tyranny, Pro-
fessor Redish suggests the Court adopt a "pragmatic formalist" 
approach to separation of powers. (p. 100-02) He describes this 
method as follows: 
The mode of interpretation I employ throughout my analysis 
of the Constitution's structural provisions is a type of ''prag-
matic formalism"-one that rejects the constraints that flow 
from an ali-or-nothing approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. By this I mean that one need not-and should not-be 
21. Others have also noted the Court's fonnalist!functionalist split personality on 
separation of powers. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 
Yale L.J. 1725, 1732-38 (1996). 
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forced to make a choice between rigid, abstract formalism on 
the one hand and totally unguided and unlimited judicial prag-
matism on the other. One may legitimately accept that the 
nature of a constitutional system imposes on the judiciary an 
obligation to engage in principled, consistent analysis and to 
make decisions that are capable of rational reconciliation with 
governing textual directives, yet simultaneously recognize that 
within those confines there exists room for the judiciary to 
take at least some account of pragmatic concerns. 
(p. 9-10) 
The formalist part of this approach is "grounded on the de-
ceptively simple principle that no branch may be permitted to 
exercise any authority definitionally found to fall outside its con-
stitutionally delimited powers." (p. 100) Professor Redish is 
quick to acknowledge that defining the branches' powers is not 
an easy job. The constitutional text is ambiguous; words' mean-
ings may evolve through time, etc. In this respect, however, he 
notes that defining branch power is really no harder than defin-
ing similarly vague constitutional provisions, i.e., "due process," 
"speech," etc. (p. 101) He insists that those who wish to interpret 
the Constitution must use its text. 
Pragmatic formalism is pragmatic in three senses. First and 
foremost, Professor Redish argues that an appropriate dose of 
formalism is pragmatic because it is instrumentally necessary for 
separation of powers to serve its vital "prophylactic" function of 
preventing tyranny: 
''Pragmatic formalism" ... is a "street-smart" mode of inter-
pretation, growing out of a recognition of the dangers to which 
a more "functional" or "balancing" analysis in the separation-
of-powers context may give rise. It recognizes that once a re-
viewing court begins down those roads in the enforcement of 
separation of powers, no meaningful limitations on inter-
branch usurpation of power remain. More importantly, it rec-
ognizes that even if functionalism and balancing could be 
employed with principled limitation, any such interpretational 
approach inherently guts the prophylactic nature of the sepa-
ration-of-powers protections, so essential a part of that system. 
(p. 100) Second, pragmatic formalism is pragmatic because it re-
quires the Court to look to policy in addition to tradition, prece-
dent, and linguistic analysis when narrowing the definitions of 
ambiguous constitutional provisions. (p. 101) Third, Professor 
Redish allows for the possibility that a branch's exercise of 'defi-
nitionally proper' power may allow that branch to interfere with 
the workings of another branch to a degree that threatens tyr-
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anny. For such instances, Professor Redish suggests the Court 
adopt a "supplemental functionalist" model, which would supple-
ment pragmatic formalism by invalidating ("formally" constitu-
tional) exercises of power which would allow a branch to unduly 
interfere with the other branches' proper operation. (p. 119-20) 
Such functionalism by itself is "too shaky a foundation to assure 
protection of separation of powers", but it is a useful pragmatic 
backstop that "can fill certain gaps left by exclusive use of a defi-
nitional formalist approach." (p. 120) 
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of Professor Redish's 
loose-reined approach is that it takes words (and thus the possi-
bility of law) seriously, but, at the same time, does not overesti-
mate our capacity to make and follow rules on how we interpret 
words. Words matter. For instance, the history of this country is 
different than it would have been without a written constitution. 
Under our relatively democratic political system, the judiciary, 
notwithstanding any epistemological problems, is bound to apply 
the words of the Constitution as representing the will of the sov-
ereign people. Professor Redish is thus quite right to insist that 
the application of the Constitution to cases should always ration-
ally-there's the word that does the work: rationally-relate to 
the words of the Constitution. 
By the same token, Professor Redish recognizes that words 
aren't always easy to use-particularly words like "judicial," "ex-
ecutive," and "legislative." Therefore, definitional inquiry (e.g., 
What does "executive" mean?) must be flexible. He does not 
attempt to give a complete account of the pragmatic factors that 
guide this flexibility, and this is probably how it should be. The 
decision-making process is too rich (and variable across people) 
to be completely cabined by lists of rules suitable for self-con-
scious application. 
However, for this same reason, although pragmatic formal-
ism seems a good habit of mind, it is not obvious that, as a practi-
cal matter, it would make much difference in many separation-of-
powers cases. This approach is sufficiently malleable (and sepa-
ration-of-powers requirements sufficiently ambiguous) that it 
would probably allow the Court, in good faith, to reach largely 
the same results that it does now. 
Professor Redish acknowledges this criticism but argues that 
his pragmatic formalist approach nonetheless would channel 
Court decisions more than functionalist approaches: 
Though there will no doubt be close cases [using the pragmatic 
formalist approach], both historical tradition and linguistic 
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common sense will impose restrictions on the Court's use of 
purely pragmatic factors in its separation-of-powers analysis. 
To be sure, a Court not acting in good faith could manipulate 
the suggested standard into meaninglessness. But that is just 
as true of any conceivable doctrinal standard, for the interpre-
tation of any constitutional provision. In any event, to do so 
would impose costs on the Court's institutional capital that 
open and admitted use of functionalism would not. The Court 
looks considerably sillier when it stoutly maintains that a fish 
is a tree than when it explains that, under appropriate consti-
tutional theory, it simply does not matter whether the item in 
question is a fish or a tree. 
(p. 102) Professor Redish's point is no doubt true to a certain 
extent. It is usually obvious, however, whether a thing is a fish or 
a tree. As a general matter, it is probably less obvious whether a 
power is legislative, executive, or judicial-at least in cases that 
make it to the Court. 
The problem of the independent counsel discussed in Morri-
son v. Olsonzz perhaps most dramatically illustrates this point. 
This case is Professor Redish's prime example of the evils of 
functionalism. He describes it as a "total failure of the judicial 
function" and a paradigmatic example of a case in which his 
pragmatic formalist approach would lead to a different result 
than functionalism. (p. 115) Just suppose Congress sets up a stat-
utory scheme under which the Attorney General must, under 
certain limited circumstances, request that a special court appoint 
and define the jurisdiction of independent counsel with the 
power to investigate and prosecute members of the executive 
branch and that the executive may only remove such counsel for 
good cause. Plus, certain members of Congress can request that 
the Attorney General seek appointment of independent counsel, 
and they also enjoy oversight over such counsel's activities.z3 A 
functionalist might inquire whether this grant of power so inter-
fered with the workings of the executive (or aggrandized the ju-
diciary and legislature) as to be unconstitutional.Z4 A pragmatic 
formalist, by contrast, would inquire whether the power to prose-
cute is definitionally part of the executive power. As part of this 
definitional inquiry, the pragmatic formalist would turn to policy, 
tradition, precedent, and linguistic analysis to shed light on what 
"executive" means. Our pragmatic formalist might well conclude 
22. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
23. For the rest of the details, see Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act, 28 
u.s.c. §§ 591-599 (1994). 
24. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92. 
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that prosecution is a "quintessentially executive function."zs Af-
ter reaching this conclusion, she would (and this is the "formal" 
part) necessarily conclude that the independent counsel law was 
unconstitutional. She would reject mushy tests designed to 
somehow determine if this grant of admittedly executive power 
to the judiciary and legislature was nonetheless constitutional be-
cause it did not interfere with the executive judiciary and legisla-
ture too much or make the other branches too strong. Thus, at 
first glance, Morrison v. Olson is a strong candidate for the prag-
matic formalist junkpile. (p. 115, 124) 
On the other hand, pragmatically turning to policy to define 
difficult words like "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" natu-
rally infuses the definitional process with the same sort of func-
tionalist mushiness Professor Redish criticizes in other 
approaches. In fact, once one allows policy to guide the process 
of defining a truly ambiguous word, pragmatic formalism may, as 
a practical matter, collapse into pragmatism, i.e., functionalism. 
For instance, what is the policy behind separation of powers? 
One answer is that separation of powers serves to protect polit-
ical liberty by preventing tyrannical concentrations of power-as 
would exist, for instance, if the legislature had the power to both 
write and enforce law. 
Turning back to Morrison, it is by no means obvious whether 
the independent counsel law advances or retards the anti-tyranny 
policy of separation of powers. One could cogently argue that, in 
the late twentieth-century state with its immense administrative 
apparatus and its (formerly?) imperial presidency, the independ-
ent counsel is an excellent means to sap the strength of the 
mighty executive. It follows that the policy behind separation of 
powers is best served by allowing independent counsel. To the 
degree this policy result pragmatically defines "executive," it ad-
vances the notion that the independent counsel law is 
constitutional. 
Professor Redish would no doubt respond that policy may 
be an important factor in fashioning one's pragmatic definitions, 
but, at a certain point, one simply goes too far. (p. 118) Control 
of prosecution is, as Justice Scalia would have it, historically a 
"core" executive function. No amount of policy can change this 
brute historical and precedential fact. Thus, for an honest and 
rational legal mind, pragmatic formalism really would compel the 
result that the independent counsel law is unconstitutional. 
25. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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This response has force. Even in legal culture, there is a 
limit to how far words can be pushed around before people get 
upset. For instance, it seems a safe proposition to bet that, within 
our lifetimes, the word "executive" will not generally mean 
"bunny rabbit," no matter how useful such a result might be from 
a policy standpoint. The problem of the independent counsel law 
does not present so obvious a case. To the degree one allows a 
functional analysis to enter the definitional argument, one can 
argue, with a perfectly straight face, that the word "executive," 
for separation-of-powers purposes, does not encompass the in-
dependent counsel's power.26 The majority in Morrison proba-
bly would have had little trouble doing so. Thus, it is not obvious 
that self-conscious adoption of pragmatic formalism would 
change judicial decisionmaking.21 
On a conceptual level, another problem bedeviling the prag-
matic formalist approach to separation of powers is the tension 
between policy analysis and Professor Redish's view that separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine must serve as a "prophylactic" that pre-
vents all interbranch encroachment, no matter how minor. (p. 
114-15) On the prophylactic view, we cannot trust the Court to 
apply a functional approach and guess when an encroachment 
gives too much power to a given branch. To effectively serve the 
policies behind separation of powers-although the Court must 
use common sense to derive its definitions of "executive," "legis-
lative," and "judicial"-the Court must apply these definitions 
prophylactically to hermetically seal the branches from one 
another. 
However, there is something odd about strictly applying def-
initions that have been loosely developed. Professor Redish 
straightforwardly declares that policy (along with tradition, pre-
cedent, and linguistic analysis) may inform the process of defin-
ing ambiguous constitutional text. Policy analysis is functional 
analysis. It examines the goals behind a text and fashions an in-
terpretation that best serves those goals. Thus, if the goal of sep-
aration of powers is to protect political liberty, the Court, in 
fashioning its definitions of the powers of the three branches, 
must consider what definitions best serve political liberty. 
26. For such an argument, see Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994). For a forecful rebuttal, see Steven G. 
Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale 
L.J. 541 (1994). 
27. Indeed, if quizzed, many Justices and judges might respond that pragmatic for-
malism is a pretty good description of the approach they take to interpretation already. 
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The prophylactic argument depends for its power, however, 
on the proposition that the Court cannot tell what results best 
serve political liberty. Thus, the pragmatic formalist definitional 
process seems to require (or at least allow) a form of policy anal-
ysis which the Court is not competent to do. It's a vicious circle. 
A second, perhaps more interesting, difficulty with the pro-
phylactic approach is that it may rely on a too judicialocentric 
view of the workings of government that exaggerates the Court's 
role in the separation-of-powers struggle.zs Professor Redish's 
argument rests on the notion that it is vitally important that the 
Court get its separation-of-powers jurisprudence right. The argu-
ment runs something like this: Separation of powers is a bulwark 
of liberty-without it, the individual protections of the Bill of 
Rights are nothing but paper. The Court defines separation-of-
powers law. If it messes up, then so much for liberty. The Court 
is bound to mess up if it adopts anything other than a prophylac-
tic approach to separation of powers. It is therefore urgent that 
the Court adopt this approach. 
Fortunately, the Framers' design is probably stronger than 
this argument presupposes. Separation-of-powers gives each 
branch tools which enable ambition to counteract ambition.z9 
The Court gets to decide cases. It justifies its decisions with opin-
ions which the other branches and the citizenry generally follow 
as authoritative. Thus, although the Court does not have guns or 
money, it has words. These words are the Court's tools in the 
separation-of-powers struggle. 
Any time the Court writes an opinion on separation of pow-
ers, it self-consciously uses its particular power to shove the 
boundaries of branch power-sometimes to profound effect, as a 
simple hypothetical illustrates. Suppose Chief Justice Marshall 
had ended Marbury v. Madison with the following paragraph: 
Then again, Congress has just as much right to interpret the 
Constitution as I do-perhaps even more, because Congress is 
the branch closest to the people, and it is the people's Consti-
tution. I was just kidding about that judicial review stuff.3o 
28. For an interesting and extended discussion of how the branches deploy their 
powers in the separation-of-powers struggle, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dan-
gerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L. Rev. 217 
(1994). 
29. Federalist 51 (Madison) in Garry Wills, ed., The Federalist Papers 262 (1982). 
30. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). 
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History would be very different, partially because such a result in 
Marbury would have grossly undermined the Court's future abil-
ity to compete in the separation-of-powers struggle successfully. 
On a more general level, Supreme Court opinions on any 
topic can affect the balance of branch power. For instance, the 
Supreme Court can undermine its authority by producing poorly 
reasoned opinions-or, much worse from a realpolitik point of 
view, unpopular opinions. The power, however, of any given de-
cision to damage a Court staffed by relatively sane Justices is 
probably limited. This is an institution that has survived Dred 
Scott31 and Plessy v. Ferguson.3z 
Of course, the other branches also shove at the boundaries 
of branch power-FDR's Court-packing plan being one notable 
example of this practice. Sometimes the law of unintended con-
sequences grabs hold. Perhaps the Court-packing plan concen-
trated the Justices' minds on finding ways to hold New Deal 
legislation constitutional, but it also blew up in FDR's face 
politically. 
At least for the last two hundred years, however, no branch 
has managed to expand its power to the point of delivering an 
obvious knock-out blow to another branch. Seen from this 
broader perspective, cases such as Morrison,33 Bowsher v. 
Synar,34 and Mistretta v. United States3s surely alter the balance 
of branch power at a given historical moment, but do not change 
the fundamental and brute fact that the Constitution puts three 
institutional heavyweights into a ring where they are free to bash 
each other. 
Judicialocentrism tends to obscure this obvious point be-
cause it causes people to dwell on the hard cases that reach the 
Supreme Court. The power of separation of powers, however, 
largely resides in its ability to keep the easy cases from ever oc-
curring. For instance, C~mgress, although it tries to weaken the 
President from time to time, has not tried to reduce the President 
to a ceremonial figurehead ala the Queen of England. Similarly, 
Congress does not make a habit of trying cases that have been 
heard by the courts. This list could be continued indefinitely. 
The Supreme Court has had two hundred years to muck 
about with separation-of-powers doctrine. Over that time, scores 
31. 60 U.S. (Howard 19) 393 (1856). 
32. 163 u.s. 567 (1896). 
33. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
34. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
35. 488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
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of Justices-each with his or her own somewhat idiosyncratic 
view of the law-have sat on the bench. Scholars have de-
nounced separation-of-powers jurisprudence as a mess. But the 
Republic endures, at least more or less. These historical facts 
tend to indicate that the Court need not rush to change its ap-
proach to separation of powers to prevent a slide into tyranny. 
III 
The Constitution as Political Structure is timely and well 
worth reading, particularly for its wonderful savaging of the 
Supreme Court's approach to federalism. Its criticisms of current 
Court and scholarly doctrines on the Tenth Amendment, the ex-
tent of Congress's Commerce Clause power (albeit pre-Lopez), 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, and separation of powers (in 
general and as applied to the problem of delegation of legislative 
power) are thought-provoking and in several instances 
compelling. 
With the exception of its prescription for the destruction of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, this book does not 
provide a sufficient framework for a coherent reworking of the 
Court's approach to federalism and separation of powers. Also, 
the book's arguments on the need for reform are not always per-
suasive. Professor Redish has done an excellent job of diagnos-
ing the doctrinal diseases afflicting the Constitution's structural 
provisions. He is less successful in showing that we need cures 
and that his would work. 
